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Abstract: 
This paper argues that the voting power approach is much more general than is portrayed 
by Albert (“The Voting Power Approach: Measurement without Theory”, European 
Union Politics, 4:3, 2003) and is therefore capable of generating important insights about 
voting systems, such as qualified majority voting in the EU Council. The voting power 
approach focuses on understanding the properties of voting systems by analysing 
outcomes and thereby is able to generate empirical facts that are not otherwise obvious. 
That the approach is so general has not previously been pointed out in the relevant 
literature; it has usually been taken as coinciding with power indices. Albert’s criticism is 
directed at one aspect of the theory of voting power indices: the assumption of 
probabilistic voting that underlies conventional power indices. It is argued that he fails to 
take account of the different uses of power indices and that the probabilistic voting 
assumptions he derides may or may not be useful depending on this. It is necessary to 
emphasise the key distinction between a priori power indices and measure of empirical 
voting power. Albert misrepresents the voting power approach and is not willing to allow 
that it encompasses a diversity of methods as well as a research agenda. 
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I. The Voting Power Approach and Power Indices  
From the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958 until its 
first expansion in 1972 its six member countries used a system of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) for certain types of decisions. The voting weights were as follows: 
France, West Germany and Italy had four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands 
two votes and Luxembourg one. From these figures one might assume that the smaller 
countries had a disproportionately large amount of influence in the Council of 
Ministers. For example, Luxembourg must have been over represented compared with 
West Germany because it had a quarter of its voting power with just over half of one 
percent (0.57%) of its population. Alternatively, Luxembourg had one vote for its 
whole population of 310,000 people while West Germany had only one vote for every 
13,572,500. Of course this disproportion was justified at the time on the grounds that 
Luxembourg was one of the six member states constituting the community and the 
system of weighted voting in the Council of Ministers was chosen to ensure the 
representation of both states and populations. 
In fact, however, Luxembourg had no voting power whatsoever over any 
decision taken by QMV. Since the threshold was set at 12 votes that were required to 
make a decision, it was mathematically impossible for Luxembourg’s one vote to be 
decisive. No matter how the other five voted, their combined total would never be 
equal to eleven. Luxembourg therefore had zero voting power. This is a finding of 
much importance - not least to the citizens and government of Luxembourg, those of 
the other member countries, as well as political scientists studying the European 
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Community. Moreover it is not immediately obvious from a casual inspection of the 
weights. It can only be understood by using the voting power approach, which requires 
an analysis of the possible voting outcomes that can theoretically occur in terms of the 
capacity of each voter to decide the issue. 
This example is well known in the voting power literature. The result was first 
pointed out by Brams and Affuso (1985) in a paper about power indices. However it 
does not actually depend on the use of power indices, requiring no more technical 
equipment than simple arithmetic. It is sufficiently important and serious that a real 
institution could commit such an apparent error that I suggest this example alone 
demonstrates the utility of the voting power approach. That a sovereign member of the 
EEC was disenfranchised by the rules of qualified majority voting, despite all 
appearances to the contrary, should be widely known, if only out of historical interest. 
But the point is widely ignored in the literature on the Council of Ministers; a recent 
example is the important book by Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997) which does not 
mention the point despite containing a discussion of power indices. 
It is easy to construct other examples of hypothetical voting systems which 
have similarly unfortunate properties by suitable choice of weights and decision rule. 
But there are also others in real institutions, not so well known as the EEC example, 
perhaps, which produce striking results. I will give two from the IMF, another body 
where QMV is the constitutional basis of its decision making. Member countries have 
weighted votes that are determined by their IMF quotas. The rules require that a 
country must cast all its votes in a bloc and therefore the system is one of weighted 
majority voting. The Executive Board has 24 members, some of whom are appointed 
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by their governments (currently these are USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia and China). The other directors are elected by groups of member 
countries arranged in so-called constituencies. Elected directors are able to cast a bloc 
of votes equal to the combined weights of the countries who elected them; in fact they 
are required to do so and cannot split them and therefore the system formally 
resembles one of winner-take-all. In many constituencies the weights are such that one 
member country (whose representative is invariably elected the director) has more 
than half the weight and is therefore formally in voting terms a dictator while the other 
members in the constituency are powerless. This is the case in the constituencies 
represented by Canada, Brazil, India, Italy and Switzerland. The power analysis in 
these cases is obvious. However in two constituencies, each with eight members, the 
structure of power is not immediately obvious and a voting power analysis reveals 
some surprising results.1 See Table 1. 
The Spanish-led constituency currently elects the Spanish representative to sit on 
the Executive Board as the representative of the eight countries in the group. A voting 
power analysis of the weights (by the author) reveals that five members are completely 
powerless and the three biggest members, Spain, Mexico and Venezuela, are all 
equally powerful. That is, it turns out that none of the five Central American members 
of the group could ever swing a vote to reach the threshold of 46,495 and that the 
ability of each of the biggest members to do so is equal. The other example is from the 
                                                  
1 Four other constituencies have a member whose voting weight is dominant while being 
just short of an absolute majority. These are the constituencies of Belgium (which has 
over 41% of the weight), the Netherlands (49%), Australia (45%) and Argentina (49%). 
These countries are not strictly dictators and the voting power approach does not give 
exact results without the use of power indices. 
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so-called Nordic/ Baltic constituency which operates somewhat differently from the 
others by choosing its executive director on a rota basis rather than by election. 
However when it comes to a weighted vote being taken in the group, it turns out that 
one member, Estonia, is found to have zero power: its 902 votes could never be 
decisive.2  
Table 1: Voting Weights in Two IMF Constituencies 
‘Spanish Led’ Constituency Votes ‘N ordic/ Baltic’ Constituency Votes 
Costa Rica 1,891 Denmark 16,678 
El Salvador 1,963 Estonia      902 
Guatemala 2,352 Finland 12,888 
Honduras 1,545 Iceland 1,426 
Mexico 26,108 Latvia 1,518 
Nicaragua 1,550 Lithuania 1,692 
Spain 30,739 Norway 16,967 
Venezuela 26,841 Sweden 24,205 
Total 92,989 Total 76,276 
Threshold 46,495 Threshold 38,139 
 
These results are of considerable interest in pointing to deficiencies in the 
current voting arrangements in the IMF and demonstrate again the utility of the voting 
power approach. Moreover, as with the example of the EEC with which we started, the 
                                                  
2  The voting figures are taken from the IMF Annual Report, IMF (2003). I have assumed 
decisions are taken by simple majority voting – that is, with reference to a threshold of 
50% of the total weight plus one - in both these analyses. The results have been obtained 
by computer search to analyse all possible voting outcomes. The details are available 
from the author on request, although since the computer program used is accessible from 
the author’s web page, the interested reader can confirm these results for himself.) 
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results are in the nature of solid mathematical facts and do not rely on any behavioural 
assumptions whatsoever. In particular they do not rely on power indices or any ideas 
about probabilistic voting. Alternatively, if we insist on using the language of power 
indices, we can say that they are the same whatever power index we use: both the 
Shapley-Shubik and the normalised Banzhaf index would give Spain, Mexico and 
Venezuela 1/3 each and the other five countries zero. Estonia gets zero on either 
index.3 
I have highlighted these examples to illustrate the voting power approach 
because they are simple in that they give completely unambiguous results that are far 
from obvious when we look at the data. Whether we wish to call this approach 
political science or not, the results are empirical facts that are unassailable and cannot 
be ignored by political scientists. However the voting power approach not only deals 
in clear cut results such as these; its more common use is in the analysis of weighted 
voting systems in which there are differences in the influence of different voters 
arising in complex ways from their different weights and the decision rule. The voting 
power approach aims to quantify this by means of power indices defined in certain 
ways for stated purposes and on certain assumptions. These are the subject of Albert’s 
critique. 
                                                  
3 Although the powers of the other seven countries will be sensitive to the choice of 
index, as between the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf. I do not consider such matters as the 
choice of a priori power index here since they have been extensively discussed 
elsewhere. See for example Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 
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II. Albert’s Misplaced Critique: Confusing a Progressive Research Agenda with 
Intolerable Ambiguity 
Professor Albert directs his attack (Albert, 2003) on his own definition of the 
voting power approach. His proximate target is the paper by Leech and Machover 
(2003, of which he was the discussant when it was presented at a conference on 
European Governance in Saarbrucken in October 2002) which uses power indices to 
study the effect of changing the QMV threshold with equitable weights. That paper is 
an exercise in the use of a priori power indices as a tool for analysing the properties of 
a voting system - and therefore as an aid for designing institutions whose properties 
conform to intended democratic principles.  
Albert takes the a priori power indices approach as if it were synonymous with 
the voting power approach in general. Since, as I have shown in the previous section, 
these are not the same, he is to an extent attacking a straw man. Moreover, his 
principal arguments are not new, having been made many times before, as much by 
advocates of power indices as critics. In doing this he is following in a tradition, 
mostly associated with the names of Garrett and Tsebelis of attacking the voting 
power approach by attacking a priori power indices. (Garrett and Tsebelis have 
published several polemics against the use of power indices to study the EU 
institutions most notably in the Journal of Theoretical Politics of which the latest is 
Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001.)  
The substance of Albert’s complaint is that voting power indices are calculated 
on the assumption of what he calls simple random voting: that voters vote randomly, 
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independently of each other and are as equally likely to vote for as against any 
proposal. This assumption is, of course, patently false as a general description of any 
actual voting behaviour. If actual voter behaviour is conceived in probabilistic terms, 
with respect to randomly selected issues, then simple random voting is an inadequate 
model which fails to take account of the likelihood that certain voters tend to vote the 
same way while others tend to oppose each other on average. But this distinction 
between actual behaviour and simple random voting cannot be the basis of a critique 
of power indices, let along the voting power approach, since almost every writer on 
the subject has also made it. I quote below from the seminal works by Shapley and 
Shubik, Banzhaf and Coleman, to emphasise the point. 
Shapley and Shubik (1954), p. 46: “The values … do not take into account any 
of the sociological or political superstructure that almost invariably exists in a 
legislature or policy board. They were not intended to be a representation of present 
day “reality”. It would be foolish to expect to be able to catch all the subtle shades and 
nuances of custom and procedure that are to be found in most real decision-making 
bodies. Nevertheless, the power index computations may be useful in the setting up of 
norms or standards, the departure from which will serve as a measure of, for example, 
political solidarity, or regional or sociological factionalism, in an assembly. To do this 
we need an empirical power index, to compare with the theoretical.”  
Banzhaf (1968), p. 308: “It is important to recognise that this technique 
measures the voting power of the individual which is inherent in the rules governing 
the voting system and the distribution of population, and does not reflect the actual 
ability that any given individual voter has in a particular election to affect the 
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outcome. The latter would depend to some extent on factors which are not inherent in 
the system, such as the relative power of the political parties in different geographical 
areas, and conditions which may be peculiar to the voter himself (e.g. whether as a 
sign of protest he decides to vote for a minority party candidate who has no chance of 
winning). Thus, a critical distinction must be drawn between inequalities in voting 
power which are built into the system (e.g. the old county unit system in Georgia or 
the distribution of votes in the Electoral College) and those which result either from 
the free choice among citizens as to how they use their voting power (e.g. the political 
impotence of a Republican in a solidly Democratic state) or from factors outside of the 
legal rules governing the process (e.g. voter intimidaton, weather, the televised 
prediction of election results, etc.). Concededly, these and other external factors may 
affect a citizen’s ability to affect the outcome of any particular election. The voting 
power measure here is that inherent in the system and necessarily represents an 
average of a voter’s effectiveness in a large number of equally likely voting situations. 
However, it is only with respect to those inequalities which result from the rules of a 
particular system of voting on which we may properly focus attention in determining 
the basic “fairness” of the system itself.” 
Coleman (1971) p. 297: “By the device of counting each partition of the 
collectivity once, and adding the number of partitions in obtaining measures of power, 
it is implicitly assumed that each member has equal probability of voting for or against 
a collective action … This is appropriate for the analysis of formal power as given by 
a constitution, that is, for an analysis of organisational rules. It does not, however, 
provide a basis for behavioural prediction of the collectivity’s action, when further 
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information exists about the members. In particular, the two assumptions made in the 
analysis of formal power, equal probabilities of positive and negative votes by each 
member, and independence of votes among members, may be empirically 
investigated, and the collectivity’s action predicted by the use of such information.”  
I have quoted at length from these seminal papers to show that their authors 
were fully aware of the distinction between a priori power indices and measures of 
empirical power and were at pains to discuss it. Albert claims that the voting power 
approach is “completely ambiguous between whether it is political science or political 
philosophy and such ambiguity is not to be tolerated”. But the issue here is not 
ambiguity but the need for more research. All the quotations above show that 
proponents of power indices conceive of two kinds of measures of power: a priori 
power indices and empirically based power indices that reflect the behaviour or 
preferences of voters. These two types of indices are fundamentally different entities 
that serve different purposes. The former enables us to analyse the properties of voting 
systems in purely constitutional terms and therefore is in a sense a tool of applied 
political philosophy that can tell us about things like equity. It has a real use in helping 
to solve normative problems like how to design weighted voting systems such as used 
by intergovernmental bodies. On the other hand, the latter relies on observed 
behaviour and belongs to positive political science. The latter has been the subject of 
much less research than the former.  
We can illustrate the point by thinking about the EU Council of Ministers. An 
understanding of where power lies requires us to take account of many relevant 
factors: the political complexions of governments, the Paris-Bonn axis, the 
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commonality among the Benelux countries, the Nordic or Mediterranean members, the 
small states versus the large states, new Europe versus old Europe, the Eurozone, etc. 
etc. Such political science would benefit from being able to use empirical power 
indices that take account of such factors as a tool of analysis. 
But from the point of view of the design of the formal voting system in a union 
that is expanding with the admission of new members being quite a normal process, it 
would clearly be inappropriate to base constitutional parameters like voting weights on 
such considerations. That might lead to, for example, allocating France smaller voting 
weight because otherwise its tendency to vote with Germany would give it more 
power, and Britain larger weight because of its tendency to independence. That would 
appear arbitrary and would fail to provide a guide for what the votes of new entrants 
should be. Far better to allocate the voting weights on the basis of general 
philosophical principles that can be seen to apply equally to all countries and citizens, 
to new members as well as old ones.4 A priori power indices are useful in this.  
Thus, the voting power approach gives rise to different power indices for 
different purposes and there is a substantial research agenda to develop and study 
them.  
The assumption of simple random voting has a different role in the two types of 
indices, as the quotation from Coleman indicates. It is conventionally a part of the 
definition of an a priori power index  - although, in fact, assumptions about 
probabilistic voting behaviour are not fundamental to them at all. On the other hand, 
                                                  
4 It would be interesting to know how Professor Albert thinks this should be done. 
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an empirical power index must be based on observed behaviour or preferences and the 
use of simple random voting is merely a convenient but inferior first approximation. 
Coleman was acutely aware of this point and his work (especially his 1971 paper but 
also his 1973 paper “Loss of Power”) contains several pointers to directions for 
needed future research into empirical power measurement.  
It is not actually necessary to assume simple random voting in order to define a 
priori power indices. All that is required is a consideration of all possible outcomes that 
can theoretically occur, taking into account that each voter has the right to choose how to 
vote. Then, as Banzhaf (1965) explained: “The measure of a legislator’s power is simply 
the number of different situations in which he is able to determine the outcome … The 
ratio of the power of legislator X to the power of legislator Y is the same as the ratio of 
the number of possible voting combinations of the entire legislature in which X can alter 
the outcome by changing his vote to the number of combinations in which Y can alter the 
outcome by changing his vote.” Thus, voting power can be defined in terms of the rights 
of individual voters: we count up each outcome because each voter has the basic right, as 
a member of the institution, to exercise choice. There is no need, therefore, to invoke the 
principle of insufficient reason to justify simple random voting. A priori voting power 
can be defined on a more fundamental level in terms of voter sovereignty.  
III. Conclusions 
I have argued, first, that the voting power approach is basically a way of thinking 
about voting systems in terms of outcomes that is capable of discovering important 
empirical facts about power, of which I have given three examples. Secondly, the neglect 
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of the voting power approach by political scientists means that these facts are often 
missed. Thirdly, the voting power approach is not the same as the use of power indices.  
Albert’s critique is mistaken in two ways. First, it is actually an attack on power 
indices though he claims to be criticising the voting power approach in general. 
Secondly, his insistence that there can only be one type of power index for all purposes 
leads him to claim that this causes “ambiguity which is not to be tolerated”. But there can 
be different types of power indices which have different uses: a priori power indices are 
used to address normative questions connected with the design of voting systems; 
empirically defined indices are used to answer positive questions about actual voting 
power.  
The voting power approach is an emerging field of research with its own inherent 
research agenda. Most serious research in it so far has focused on a priori power indices 
but that does not mean that there is not a need for further research on developing 
empirically valid approaches to the measurement of voting power. 
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